To enhance user privacy, anonymous credential systems allow the user to convince a verifier of the possession of a certificate issued by the issuing authority anonymously. The typical application is the privacy-enhancing electronic ID (eID). Although a previously proposed system achieves the constant complexity in the number of finiteset attributes of the user, it requires the use of RSA. In this paper, we propose a pairing-based anonymous credential system excluding RSA that achieves the constant complexity. The key idea of our proposal is the adoption of a pairingbased accumulator that outputs a constant-size value from a large set of input values. Using zero-knowledge proofs of pairing-based certificates and accumulators, any AND and OR relation can be proved with the constant complexity in the number of finite-set attributes. We implement the proposed system using the fast pairing library, compare the efficiency with the conventional systems, and show the practicality in a mobile eID application.
Introduction
Electronic identification has been widely applied to access authorization to buildings, use of facilities, Web services, etc. Currently, electronic identity (eID) such as eID card is often used. The eID is issued by a trusted organization such as the government, company, or university, and is used for its service. Trusted ID is very attractive for secondary use in commercial services. The eID includes attributes of the user such as the name, the address, the gender, the occupation, and the date of birth. In commercial cases, the attribute-based authentication is desired. For example, a service provider can deny access to kids, by checking the age in the eID.
One of serious issues in the existing eID systems is user's privacy. In the systems, the eID may reveal the user's identity. The service provider can collect the use history of each user. Anonymous credential systems [10] , [12] , [13] are one of the solutions.
An anonymous credential system basically consists of the setup algorithm, issuing protocol and proof protocol. The participants are an issuing authority, users, and verifiers. In the setup algorithm, an issuing authority generates his/her public key ipk and secret key isk. ipk is bound to the issuing authority. In the issuing protocol, the issuing authority with isk issues a certificate cert to a user, given common input ipk. Each certificate is a proof of membership, qualification, or privilege, and contains user's attributes. In the proof protocol, given the common input ipk, the nakanisi@cne.okayama-u.ac.jp * The preliminary versions of this paper were presented at PETS 2011 [18] and IMECS 2011 [19] .
user with cert can prove to a verifier that the user has a certificate issued by the authority bound to ipk. This protocol is anonymous, i.e., the verifier cannot know who is the proving user. This means that only ipk is the public key and the user's public key is not used. In addition, the proving user can disclose some selected attributes without revealing any other information about the user's privacy. Furthermore, the user can prove complex relations of the attributes using AND and OR relations. AND relation is used when proving the possession of all of the multiple attributes. For example, the user can prove that he is a student, and has a valid student card, when entering the faculty building. OR relation represents the proof for possession of one of multiple attributes. For example, he can prove that he is either a staff or a teacher when using a copy machine in a laboratory. An implementation of eID on a standard java card is shown in Ref. [6] .
In Ref. [13] , Camenisch and Lysyanskaya firstly proposed an anonymous credential system based on RSA. Unfortunately, it suffers from a linear complexity in the number of user's attributes in proving AND and OR relations. Hence, this system is not suitable for small devices such as smart cards. In Ref. [10] , Camenisch and Groß extended the scheme to solve the drawback. They classified attribute types into two categories: string attributes and finite-set attributes. The former can be represented as a string, such as name and ID number. The latter can be represented as an element from relatively small finite-set, such as gender and profession. There are much fewer string type of attributes, and thus the costs on finite-set attribute types impacts the total efficiency. In Camenisch-Groß system, by encoding a large number of finite-set attributes into prime numbers, one value for the finiteset attributes can be embedded into the certificate. Then, the AND and OR relations are proved with the constant complexity in the number of finite-set attributes using zero-knowledge proofs of integer relations on prime numbers. However, this extended system also depends on RSA. Currently, 1,024-bit RSA modulus is obsolete, and we require 2,048 bits or more. As the modulus size increases, the data size in the authentication becomes larger, and the processing times also become larger. To shorten the data size, a pairing-based system excluding the RSA assumption is desired.
In this paper, for a pairing-based anonymous credential system using BBS+ signatures [8] , we show how to prove AND and OR relations with constant complexity. It seems difficult to adopt the approach in Camenisch-Groß system. This is because their approach strictly depends on integer commitments on the strong RSA assumption to prove the integer relation over integers, as mentioned in Ref. [10] . This is why we adopt a different approach. The key idea of the construction is the adoption of a pairing-based accumulator [12] . The accumulator outputs a constant-size value from a large set of input values. We consider that the input values are assigned to attributes. Then, we utilize an extended BBS+ signatures to certify a set of attributes as the accumulator. Using zero-knowledge proofs of BBS+ signatures and accumulators, we can prove AND and OR relations with constant complexity in the number of finite-set attributes. The drawback is that the size of public key is depending on the number of attribute values. It varies from 1 MBytes to 10 MBytes for the number of attribute values 1,000 to 15,000. In the current mobile environments, the data size is sufficiently practical, since the public key is not changed after it is distributed.
To show the efficiency of our system, we implemented the system using a pairing library, and compare the processing time to a conventional pairing-based anonymous credential system with linear complexity. In addition, we compare our system to the RSA-based Camenisch-Groß system. Furthermore, we implemented a prototype system of eID application and show the processing time including the communication to confirm practicality.
Remark 1 In the RSA-based anonymous credential system with efficient complexity [10] , NOT relation is also equipped. Namely, the prover can prove that a specified attribute is not in his certificate. On the other hand, our system does not have the protocol to directly prove NOT relation. However, OR relation substitutes NOT relation. In an attribute type, let S = {a 1 , . . . , a k } be the set of all attribute values of the attribute type. Into the user's certificate, an element from S is embedded. Here we assume that any user owns an attribute from S . In the case that the user does not own any attribute value from the attribute type, we can insert the value indicating no attribute value into S . Consider the proof that the user's attribute is not a 1 . This proof can be performed by the OR proof that the user owns some attribute of S − {a 1 }. For example, for proving that the user is not a student, we can prove that she has some of all other profession attribute values including the value indicating no profession.
Preliminaries

Bilinear Groups
Our scheme utilizes the following bilinear groups: ( 1 ) G 1 , G 2 , and G T are multiplicative cyclic groups of prime order p, ( 2 ) g and h are randomly chosen generator of G 1 and G 2 , respectively, ( 3 ) e is an efficiently computable bilinear map: e : u , v) and e(u, vv ) = e(u, v)e(u, v ), and thus for all u ∈ G 1 , v ∈ G 2 and a, b ∈ Z, e(u a , v b ) = e(u, v) ab , and ( 2 ) e(g, h) 1.
Assumptions
The security of our scheme is based on the q-SDH assumption [7] , the q-HSDH (Hidden SDH) assumption [9] , and q-TDH (Triple DH) assumption [5] for the underlying signatures, and n-DHE assumption [12] for the accumulator, where q, n are nonnegative integer.
Definition 1 (q-SDH assumption) For all PPT algorithm A, the probability
is negligible, where g ∈ R G 1 , h ∈ R G 2 and a ∈ R Z p . Definition 2 (q-HSDH assumption) For all PPT algorithm A, the probability
is negligible, where g ∈ R G 1 , h,ĥ ∈ R G 2 , a ∈ R Z p , and b, b i ∈ Z p . Definition 3 (q-TDH assumption) For all PPT algorithm A, the probability
is negligible, where g ∈ R G 1 , h ∈ R G 2 , a, b ∈ R Z p , and c i , c ∈ Z p . Definition 4 (n-DHE assumption) For all PPT algorithm A, the probability
is negligible, where g ∈ R G 1 , h ∈ R G 2 and a ∈ R Z p .
Extended Accumulator with Efficient Updates
In Ref. [12] , the accumulator with efficient updates is proposed. The accumulator is generated from a set of values, and we can verify that a single value is accumulated. Thus, for k values, we have to verify that each value is accumulated multiple times. This means that the complexity depends on the number of proved values, k. Here, we extend the accumulator to verify that k values are accumulated with the constant complexity.
Here, we consider that some values in {1, . . . , n} with size n are accumulated. Let V be a set of accumulated values that is a subset of {1, . . . , n}. Let U = {i 1 , . . . , i k } be a subset of V with size k. The c 2012 Information Processing Society of Japan accumulator allows us to confirm that all elements of U belong to V, i.e., U ⊆ V, all at once. AccSetup: This is the algorithm to output the public parameters. Select bilinear groups G 1 , G 2 , G T with a prime order p and a bilinear map e. Select g ∈ R G 1 and h ∈ R G 2 . Select γ ∈ R Z p and compute and publish p, 
Since AccVerify accepts these,
Thus, we have ĩ∈U i∈V
We obtain
For anyĩ ∈ U 1 and any i ∈ V, h n+1−i+ĩ h n+1 , due to U 1 ∩ V = φ. Also, for anyĩ ∈ U 2 and any i ∈ V satisfying i ĩ, h n+1−i+ĩ h n+1 . Therefore, we can compute h n+1 given g 1 , . . . , g n , g n+2 , . . . , g 2n , h 1 , . . . , h n , h n+2 , . . . , h 2n , which contradicts n-DHE assumption.
Modified BBS+ Signatures
We utilize an extension of BB signature scheme [7] , called BBS+ signatures. The extension is informally introduced in Ref. [8] and the concrete construction is shown in Refs. [2] , [15] . This scheme allows us to sign a set of messages. Our system requires that the accumulator is signed. In the BBS+ signature, the messages to be signed are set in exponents (elements of Z p ), whereas the accumulator is the product of g i 's from G 1 . Thus, we modify the BBS+ signature to be able to sign on g i 's, as follows. mBBS+Setup: Select bilinear groups G 1 , G 2 , G T with a prime order p and a bilinear map e. Select g,
mBBS+KeyGen: Select X ∈ R Z p and compute Y = g
The secret key is X and the public key is (p,
The signature is (A, w, r).
The modified BBS+ signature is unforgeable against adaptively chosen message attack under the q-SDH assumption. It is shown in a similar way to Ref. [3] , as follows. BB signatures. Since the security is proved using the security of the underlying BB signatures [7] , we briefly show the scheme. BBSetup: Select bilinear groups G 1 , G 2 , G T with a prime order p and a bilinear map e.
The secret key is X and the public key is BB signatures are existentially unforgeable against weak chosen message attack under the q-SDH assumption [7] . In this attack, the adversary must choose messages queried for the signing oracle, before the public key is given. Theorem 2 mBBS+ signature is unforgeable against adaptively chosen message attack under the q-SDH assumption.
Proof. This proof is derived from Ref. [3] .
c 2012 Information Processing Society of Japan Assume that A breaks the unforgeability of mBBS+ signatures, and we construct the following simulator B breaking BB signatures that are secure under the q-SDH assumption.
B chooses random messages w 1 , . . . , w q−1 for BB signatures, and is given the corresponding BB signatures
with the public key (p,
B sets the public key of mBBS+ signatures (p, G 1 , G 2 , e, g, g 0 , g 1 , . . . , g n , g n+2 , . . . , g 2n , g 1 , . . . ,g L , h, Y, Z), and runs A. Out of q signing queries from A, B randomly selects a query, which called * query. For messages
To the queries except * , B responds using the BB signature (B i , w i ) as follows. B selects r i ∈ R Z p , and compute a i = r i + t i and the following A i .
To the * query, B sets r
1/(X+w * ) and returns (A * , w * , r * ).
Finally, A outputs the forged signature (A , w , r ) on message (m 1 , . . . , m n , m n+2 , . . . , m 2n , M 1 , . . . , M L ). There are three cases. Define
• Case I [w {w 1 , . . . , w q , w * }]: B computes the following B .
This means that a BB signature for a new message w is forged, which contradicts q-SDH assumption. 
Some Δm j is not 0 or some ΔM j is not 0. With the probability 1/q, w = w * . Then, from
compute the following B .
This means that a BB signature for a new message w * is forged, which contradicts q-SDH assumption. The security proof assumes that valid g j 's are signed, instead of any element from G 1 . Thus, for proving the knowledge of this signature, we have to ensure the correctness of g j 's by other technique, the following F-secure BB signatures.
F-secure BB Signatures
We also adopt another variant of BB signature scheme, called F-secure signature [5] . FBBSetup: Select bilinear groups G 1 , G 2 , G T with a prime order p and a bilinear map e. Select g ∈ R G 1 and h,ĥ ∈ R G 2 . FBBKeyGen: SelectX,X ∈ R Z p and computeỸ = gX,Ŷ = gX, Z = hX,Ẑ = hX. The secret key is (X,X) and the public key is (p,
The public key can be checked by e(Ỹ, h) = e(g,Z) and e(Ŷ, h) = e(g,Ẑ).
T, S ) = e(g, h) and e(T,ĥ) = e(Ŷ, U).
F-security means that no adversary can output (F(M), σ) where σ is the signature on message M s.t. he has never previously obtained the signature after his adaptive chosen message attacks. The security is proved under the q-HSDH and q-TDH assumptions [5] .
Proving Relations on Representations
We adopt zero-knowledge proofs of knowledge (PKs) on representations, which are the generalization of the Schnorr identification protocol [11] . Concretely we utilize a PK proving the knowledge of a representation of C ∈ G 1 to the bases g 1 , g 2 , . . . , g t ∈ G 1 , i.e., x 1 , . . . , x t s.t. C = g Since we use only prime-order groups, we can extract the proved secret knowledge given two accepting protocol views whose commitments are the same and whose challenges are different.
Proposed System
Construction Idea
As in Ref.
[10], we categorize finite-set attributes and string attributes. In the finite-set attributes, the values are binary or from a pre-defined finite set, for example, gender, degree, nationality, etc. On the other hand, name and identification number are the string attributes.
Our proposal is based on the pairing-based anonymous credential system using the BBS+ signatures, which is described in Ref. [12] for example. In the underlying system, the certificate is a BBS+ signature [8] , where each attribute type is expressed as an exponent on a base assigned to the attribute type, such asg M j j , and all parts ofg M j j have to be signed. Namely, the certificate is (A, w, r) s.t.
, where x is a secret identity that only the user with the certificate knows. Then, proving the knowledge of the signature needs the cost depending on the number of attribute types.
To express the finite-set attributes (For the string type, we still use the exponent), we use a pairing-based accumulator in Ref. [12] . Let all attribute values in all finite-set attribute types be numbered. The j-th attribute value is assigned to an input value g j 's in the accumulator. The multiple inputs (i.e., attribute values) are accumulated into a single value. When V is the set of indexes of the attribute values for a user, they are accumulated to acc V = j∈V g n+1− j . We consider that the accumulated value is signed by a modified BBS+ signature,
, where the original representationg M j j is still used for the string type.
However, in the PK of the modified BBS+ signature, acc V is committed for secrecy. That is, the validity of the committed value (i.e., it is the form of acc V ) is unknown to the verifier. The PK for representations only proves the form of
, for some R ∈ G 1 . However, the security proof of the modified BBS+ signatures assumes that the message is the product of g j 's, i.e., 
It is unknown whether this forge is meaningful or not. However, we cannot prove the security of our protocols, if the validity of acc V is unknown and the modified BBS+ signature is forgeable. Thus, we add another signature on acc V by signing the exponent j∈V γ n+1− j . This approach is also used in Ref. [12] to ensure the g j in the membership certificate. They use a weakly secure BB signature [7] , based on interactive HSDH assumption [4] or HSDHE assumption [12] . We consider that it is a rather strong assumption. This is why we use the F-secure BB signature [5] derived from fully secure BB signature, based on the better assumptions (HSDH assumption and TDH assumption). AND relation. For AND relation (a 1 ∧ · · · ∧ a k ), it is needed to prove that a specified set of attributes (a 1 , . . . , a k ) are all embedded into the user's certificate. Using AccVerify in the extended accumulator, we can prove that multiple values are accumulated to the accumulator in the certificate with constant complexity. By the similar way to Ref. [12] , we can obtain the PK of AccVerify with constant complexity. OR relation. For OR relation (a 1 ∨ · · · ∨ a k ), it is needed to prove that one (denoted asã) of a specified set of attributes (a 1 , . . . , a k ) is embedded into the user's certificate. Similarly to AND relation, using AccVerify, a signer can prove that a valueã is accumulated to the accumulator in the certificate. Furthermore, the verifier prepares another accumulator acc from specified attributes a 1 , . . . , a k . Then, the signer proves that the same valueã is accumulated to the additional accumulator acc .
Proposed Construction
The following construction uses the asymmetric pairings defined in Section 2.1. Our implementation shown later is based on a library of asymmetric pairings. By letting G 1 = G 2 , our construction can be also implemented by symmetric pairings.
Setup
The inputs of this algorithm are , n, and L, where is the security parameter, n is the maximum number of finite-set attribute values, and L is the maximum number of string attribute types. The outputs are issuer's public key ipk and issuer's secret key isk.
( 1 ) Select bilinear groups G 1 , G 2 , G T with the same order p with length and the bilinear map e.
as follows:
( 4 ) Output the issuer public key ipk = (p,
, and the issuer secret key isk = (X,X,X,X ,X , γ).
Issuing Certificate
This is an interactive protocol between the issuer Issuer and user User. The common inputs of this protocol consist of ipk, and (SA, FA) that are sets of string attribute values and finiteset attribute values of the user, respectively. Each string attribute 
.
In addition, select μ ∈ R Z p − {X
} and compute an F-secure BB signature ensuring acc as follows:
Return (A, S , T, U, F, w, r ) to User. ( 3 ) [User] Compute r = r + r , verify:
F).
Output cert = (A, S , T, U, F, x, w, r).
Attribute Proofs
This is a protocol between the user and the verifier. The common inputs are ipk, and (TSA, TFA) are subsets of string attributes and finite-set attributes respectively, which are referenced in proofs, and user's secret inputs are cert and (SA, FA).
Proving AND Relation.
For TFA = {a 1 , . . . , a k } with a j ∈ {1, . . . , n}, the user shows his possession of the certificate which includes all of the attributes, i.e., a 1 ∧ a 2 ∧ . . . ∧ a k .
( 1 ) The user computes the witness that a 1 , . . . , a k are included in the accumulator of FA as:
( 3 ) The user selects ρ w , ρ ∈ R Z * p , sets α = wρ A , ζ = ρ S ρ a and ξ = ρ S ρ T . The user computes auxiliary commitments C w = h wĥρw and C ρS = h ρSĥρ . Then, the user sets ρ α = ρ w ρ A , ρ ζ = ρ ρ a , and ρ ξ = ρ ρ T .
( 4 ) The user sends the commitments (C A , C S , C T , C U , C F , C a , C W , C w , C ρS ) to the verifier. ( 5 ) By using the proof of knowledge (PK) for representations, the user proves the knowledge of x, w, r, ρ A , ρ S , ρ T , ρ U , ρ F , ρ a , ρ W , ρ w , ρ , α, ζ, ξ, ρ α , ρ ζ , ρ ξ , and M j for M j TSA s.t.
e(ỸC a C T , C S )e(g, h)
e(C a ,h)e(g,
Proving OR Relation. For TFA = {a 1 , . . . , a k }, the user shows his possession of the certificate which includes one of the attributes, i.e., a 1 ∨ a 2 ∨ . . . ∨ a k . Assume thatã is the proved attribute.
Before the protocol, the user and the verifier prepare another accumulator acc = a j ∈TFA g n+1−a j . This protocol is obtained by modifying the protocol of the AND relation, as follows.
( 1 ) Similarly, the user computes W = a ã a∈FA h n+1−a+ã for acc. Furthermore, the user computes the new witness W = a j ã a j ∈TFA h n+1−a j +ã for acc . ( 2 ) In addition to step 2 in AND relation, the user selects ρ g , ρ W , ρS , ρT , ρŨ , ρ h ∈ R Z * p , and compute the new commit-
CŨ =Ũãĥ ρŨ , and C h = hãĥ ρh .
( 3 ) In addition to step 3 in AND relation, the user selectsρ,ρ ∈ R Z * p , sets δ = ρ h ρ a ,ζ = ρS ρ g andξ = ρS ρT . The user computes auxiliary commitments C ρh = h ρhĥρ and C ρS = h ρSĥρ .
Then, the user sets ρ δ =ρρ a , ρζ =ρ ρ g , and ρξ =ρ ρT . ( 4 ) The user sends the commitments
Similarly to the AND relation, the user conducts the PK, where Eq. (7) is replaced by
and the following equations are added:
e(Ỹ C g CT , CS )e(g,h)
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Security
Here, we show that the proposed protocols are the PKs for AND and OR relations on the finite-set attributes. The security on the string attributes can be proved in the similar way to the underlying protocols.
Theorem 3 The protocol of AND relation is a proof of knowledge of a modified BBS+ signature (A, w, r) on secret x, the string type of attributes M 1 , . . . , M L , and the finite-set type of attributes indicated by accumulator acc, s.t. all attributes in TFA are accumulated to acc. Proof. From the PK, we have an extractor of knowledge satisfying Eqs. (1)- (7). Using Eq. (1), we obtain 1 = (h wĥρw ) ρA h −αĥ−ρα , and thus 1 = h wρA−αĥρwρA−ρα . Since the discrete log ofĥ to base h is unknown under the DL assumption (due to q-SDH assumption), this means α = wρ A . By substituting this to Eq. (2), we have
Thus, we can extract A = C Aĝ −ρA and acc = C aĝ −ρa s.t.
e(A, Yh
Similarly, using Eq. (3), we have ζ = ρ S ρ a and ξ = ρ S ρ T . By substituting them to Eq. (4), we have
Thus, for the extracted acc = C aĝ −ρa , we can extract S = C Sĥ
−ρS
and T = C Tĝ −ρT s.t. e(Ỹ · acc · T, S ) = e(g, h). Similarly, using Eqs. (5), (6), we obtain U = C Uĥ −ρU and F = C Fĥ −ρF s.t.
e(T,h) = e(Ŷ, U) and e(acc,h) = e(g, F)
. Since F-secure BB signatures w.r.t. the public keyỸ,Ŷ is issued on only accumulators, it means acc = a∈FA g n+1−a for FA of a user (otherwise, the signature is forgeable).
On the other hand, using Eq. (7) Similarly to the extraction of F-secure BB signature in the AND relation, using Eqs. (10)- (13), we can extract the F-secure BB signature (S ,T ,Ũ) onG = C gĝ −ρg andF = C hĝ −ρh s.t.
e(Ỹ GT ,S ) = e(g,h), e(T , h) = e(Ŷ ,Ũ) and e(G, h) = e(g,F).
Since F-secure BB signatures w.r.t. the public keyỸ ,Ŷ is issued on only ( 
Implementation and Experiments
Used Pairing Library
In the implementation of our system (and the compared conventional system), we utilize the fast pairing library called "Cross-twisted χ-based Ate (Xt-Xate) pairing" [1] with 254-bit group order and the embedding degree is 12, as in Ref. [20] .
Comparisons to Conventional System
We compare the efficiency between our system and the conventional pairing-based system [12] using the BBS+ signatures. The anonymous credential system described in Ref. [12] does not equip proofs of AND and OR relations. However, similarly to the conventional RSA-based systems described in Ref. [10] , we can construct the proof protocols for AND and OR relations, which are described in Appendix A.1. We introduce the following parameters.
• L: the total number of string attribute types •L: the total number of finite-set attribute types (e.g., gender, profession) • n: the total number of finite-set attribute values (e.g., male, female, student, teacher) • k: the number of attributes referenced in a proof. We measured the computation time of the systems using a laptop PC with the specifications shown in Table 1 .
In this environment, the computation times for a pairing computation, an exponentiation on G 1 , an exponentiation on G 2 , and an exponentiation on G T are about 13.69 ms, 1.84 ms, 3.52 ms, and 4.63 ms, respectively. We set L = 3,L is varied from 5 to 100, and k is varied from 10 to 100. In the implementation, we use pre-computations for pairing calculations of fixed values such c 2012 Information Processing Society of Japan as public key and certificate, as in Ref. [17] . Figure 1 shows the comparisons for proof generation and verification times in case of AND relation. Figure 2 shows them in case of OR relation. We varyL from 5 to 100, and fix k = 10 and n = 15, 000 (in the case of proposed system). In the proof generation, forL < 30, the time of the conventional system is better than the proposed system. In contrast, whenL > 30, our proposed system becomes more efficient than the conventional one. The proof generation time of proposed system is constant at about 165 ms and 345 ms, for AND relation and OR relation, respectively. Table 2 shows the example of attributes in eID. In the conventional system, if a user may own multiple attribute values from an attribute type, we have to prepare bases for the possible multiple values, namelyL increases by the number of possible multiple values. For example, a user can have multiple profession attributes such as student and technician in a company, and a user may own 5 or more language ability. As the results,L becomes relatively large. Therefore, in the general case thatL > 30, proving AND relation in our system has more efficiency. Figure 3 shows the comparison for the OR relation proof in the variety of k. We vary k from 10 to 100, and set L +L = 100 and n = 15, 000. As the result, our proposed system is not influenced by k, unlike the conventional system, which make it much more efficient.
On the other hand, the proposed system has a drawback that the size of public key varies from 1 MBytes to 10 MBytes when n is from 1,000 to 15,000, as shown in Fig. 4 . However, in the current mobile environments, the data size is sufficiently practical, since the public key is not changed after it is distributed.
Comparisons to Camenisch-Groß System
Next, we compare our pairing-based system to RSA-based Camenisch-Groß system. For the implementation of CamenischGroß System, the idemix (Identity Mixer) library is available [16] . The library is implemented by Java, while our implementation uses C language. Thus, this is not a fair comparison, but for reference we show the comparisons. The specifications are the same as Table 1 , where Java version is 1.6.0 26 and idemix library version is 2.3.3. The size of RSA modulus is set as 3,072 bits, to adjust the our implementation based on 254-bit c 2012 Information Processing Society of Japan Tables 3, 4 show the comparisons for AND proof and OR proof, respectively. Note that both systems achieve the constant complexity. As for the processing times, our system is extremely better, although the implementation languages are different. As for the proof sizes, our system is also better, since data size for one element in the proof is shorter than the RSA-based system.
Application to eID 5.4.1 Summary of Implementation
To confirm the practicality of our system, we implemented a prototype system of eID application. At first, the issuer publishes its public key ipk. Then, the user registers himself along with particular attributes (SA, FA) to the issuer for certification by using the Issuing protocol via a secure channel. Based on the issued certificate, he requests a service to the Service Provider (SP). Then, the SP specifies attributes that the SP wants to know. This specification forms AND or OR relation, depending on the SP's requirement. Then, the user generates a proof for the possession of certificate w.r.t. the specified attribute(s) and shows it to the SP (verifier) anonymously by using the attribute proof protocol. If and only if the verification of user's proof is valid, the SP grants the user to access a requested service.
We implemented this prototype system using Java through the Java GUI and Java applet at the user and Java servlet at the Service Provider (SP) and the issuer, since the Java applet and Java servlet communications are often used for the web-based applications. The communication between the user and the servers (i.e., the issuer and SP) is over http connections. In our implementation, since algorithms of our anonymous credential system are implemented by C language as the middle-ware, we use Java Native Interface (JNI) as the interface between C and Java.
Experimental Results
The devices and software specifications used in this exper- iment are shown in Table 5 . We used a laptop PC with an atom CPU for the user to simulate the mobile situation. The user PC is connected to the SP and issuer PCs via wireless LAN (IEEE802.11 b/g). Figure 5 shows the total processing times of the issuing protocol and proof protocol. The total time of the proof protocol includes the proof generation time, the verification time, and the communication time during the process. This time varies from 714 ms to 738 ms for AND relation, when n is from 1,500 to 15,000. It is from 1,103 ms to 1,152 ms for the OR relation. The communication time is measured from sending the proof until receiving the response of the proof process from the verifier without verification time. The communication time is about 120 ms. The time of the issuing protocol varies from 654 ms to 690 ms when n increases from 1,500 to 15,000. In every case, we can confirm the practicality of our system for a mobile PC.
Conclusion
In this paper, for a pairing-based anonymous credential system, we have showed how to prove AND and OR relations on attributes with constant complexity in the number of finite-set attributes. From the experiments for the implementations, we showed the more efficiency than the conventional system and the RSA-based system, and the practicality in the mobile applications. The compensation is the increase of the public key size, although the public key is not changed after it is distributed.
Our future works include the implementations in smartphones and their applications to network services.
